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Introduction
The history of large-scale information technology (IT)
projects is littered with examples of failure and this is
unfortunately also true of healthcare settings.1–3 A
central reason underpinning many of these failures is
that IT initiatives are often politically rather than
clinically motivated, resulting in disenfranchisement
of healthcare professionals and other key stakeholders
from the outset. Once a policy decision has been taken,
the lack of appreciation of and attention to the socio-
cultural implications of new developments on patterns
of working and organisational processes is a further
recipe for disaster.
Despite the fact that some critics have (repeatedly)
called for a radical rethink of the UK government’s
National Programme for InformationTechnology,NHS
Connecting for Health (NHS CFH) is pressing ahead
with development and implementation of a range of
IT initiatives, including deployment of its ﬂagship
electronic health record – the NHS CRS – in English
hospitals. Cognisant of the reality of the situation, and
based on the ﬁndings of our recent systematic review
of the international literature on the role of IT in
health care,4 we reﬂect on key socio-technical issues
that should, we believe, be considered in order to
maximise the chances of realising the vision of suc-
cessfully implementing an integrated and nationally
used and useful electronic health record (EHR) into
English hospitals at this crucial stage of the implemen-
tation story.5–7 This case study will, we hope, oﬀer
important insights for similar electronic health record
implementations now actively being pursued in parts
of North America, Western Europe, Australasia and
the Middle East.
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The implementation of the National Health
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mation Technology. Its implementation is however
proving extremely challenging. Building on a recent
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The National Programme for
Information Technology,
NHS CFH and the NHS CRS
The National Programme for Information Technology
was formally established by the then Prime Minister
Tony Blair in 2002 as a ten-year initiative to introduce
a range of IT systems throughout the NHS. It is the
most ambitious national civilian IT venture of its kind
anywhere is the world and it is suggested that it will, if
successfully implemented, result in signiﬁcant im-
provements to the safety and quality of care, as well
as substantial cost savings in the longer-term.8 In 2004
NHS CFH, an arms-length body of the Department of
Health, took responsibility fordelivering theprogramme.
Whilst the programme has made signiﬁcant pro-
gress is some areas (e.g. the Picture Archiving and
Communication System), a host of problems have
beset other functionalities such as the Electronic Pre-
scription Service and the Summary Care Record. These
problems have included contractual diﬃculties with
system suppliers, a signiﬁcant underestimation of cost,
delays in implementation schedules, changing scope,
negative publicity and negative views from healthcare
staﬀ on the ground.8–10
The NHS CRS is made up of a complex range of
interrelated IT applications aimed at facilitating data
sharing and seamless clinical care (see Figure 1). It is in
many ways the backbone of the programme and as such
represents a fundamentally transformative initiative.
This is, however, also a potentially very disruptive
organisational transformation as the current mixture
of paper-based and local electronic record systems are
systematically replaced by nationally shared electronic
records.5
Several countries are planning widespread im-
plementation of electronic health records and some
healthcare systems have already developed and em-
bedded EHRs in individual hospitals or in localised
regions. Most activity in this respect is taking place in
the USA (e.g. Kaiser Permanente), where this subject
matter has been given a massive political boost fol-
lowing President Obama’s recent announcement of a
national electronic health record strategy. Other areas
of activity include Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
several countries in Western Europe (such as the
Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries) and the
Middle East (such as the Kingdomof Saudi Arabia and
the United Arab Emirates).
The broader political vision is to achieve inter-
operable health records between diﬀerent healthcare
providers and settings and possibly also across diﬀer-
ent countries. In relation to the English venture –
which is the ﬁrst national implementation of an
inpatient electronic health record in secondary care
– it is important that every eﬀort is made to minimise
the possibility of high proﬁle failure, not only because
of the risks that this might pose to patient safety and
the considerable expenditure, but also because the
English experiment will almost certainly cause major
ripples in other parts of the world.1–3
Figure 1 Schematic model of NHSCRS. CDSS, computerised decision support system; Prescribing, electronic
prescribing; GP systems, general practice systems; NHS CRS, NHS Care Record Service; NHS DCR, NHS Detailed
Care Record; NHS SCR, NHS Summary Care Record; PACS, Picture Archiving and Communication System
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Lessons from the literature
Whilst the literature on implementation of EHRs
is at present inevitably somewhat limited, there are
nonetheless a number of salutary case studies. Sicotte
and colleagues, for example, describe the introduction
of electronic health records into four hospitals in
the United States.2 The cost of this introduction was
considerable at $45 million, but the project failed due
to the system being rejected by healthcare staﬀ as they
found that the application did not ﬁt in with existing
care processes. This high-proﬁle example brought into
sharp focus the need for a socio-technical viewpoint,
considering social and technical dimensions as closely
interrelated when seeking to understand work pro-
cesses orﬁtness-for-purpose.Concerns about the impact
on work processes have already publicly been expressed
in relation to pilot implementations of the NHS Care
Records Service.11
Figure 2 summarises factors that have been repeat-
edly found to be important for the successful im-
plementation of EHRs across the world. Discussed
below are some of the key lessons from the literature.
The need for realistic expectations
Sauer and Willcocks have helpfully noted that the
transformational nature, complexity and sheer scale of
the introduction of the NHS CRS will almost certainly
result in certain problems that are common to most
so-called ‘mega-programmes’.10 These include factors
relating to length, scale, unpredictability (often resulting
in uncertainty) and the need to interface and engage
with a very large number and wide variety of stake-
holders. They argue that such mega-programmes there-
fore need to be viewed through a lens very diﬀerent
from the one through which we typically view more
circumscribed initiatives. The implications of this
include the need for a considerable lowering of the
bar of expectations, at least in the short- to medium-
term, and the need for far more honesty and trans-
parency in relation to, for example, mitigating actions
takenwhen things (predictably) begin to go oﬀ course.
It is therefore important, they argue, for all stake-
holders to recognise that the signiﬁcant transform-
ations of health care expected to be brought about by
the NHS CRS will only be able to be planned for to a
certain extent. The need for periodic reconsideration
of options and approaches, as well as attempts at
reconciling diﬀerent emerging viewpoints such as,
for example, those between NHS CFH (the commis-
sioners and politicians), local service providers (the
technical designers), NHS trusts (the organisations)
and clinicians on the ground (the end-users), is there-
fore only to be expected.10
Also relevant in this context is the discussion by
Garside of theories of organisational change and how
these can be applied to health care.12 One of these is
Dawson’s model of imperatives for change, which
introduces the idea that large-scale programmes should
allow for and will have elements of both rationality
and irrationality, this latter consideration being par-
ticularly important in the context of implementing
complex and often unpredictable process change. The
practical upshot of this is that planning and imple-
mentation should be an iterative process. This can,
Figure 2 Factors important for the successful implementation of EHRs identiﬁed in the literature.1 Includes
usability, performance and integration, adaptability and ﬂexibility;2 includes attitudes, motivations, resist-
ance and expectations, engagement and user input in design, training and support, champions, integration
with existing work processes;3 includes getting the organisation ready for change, planning, leadership and
management, teamwork and communication, learning and evaluation, realistic expectations
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however, be disconcerting for those used to far more
linear models of working, particularly when planning
and implementation are being undertaken in the light
of considerable political and public scrutiny (and at
times frank hostility). Hence, it is important that every
eﬀort is made to engage with the various stakeholder
groups to make clear that such changes to approach
are very much the norm, rather than the exception.
Recognition of the need to plan for and, where
necessary, make use of a more ﬂexible approach is
therefore important. This must not, however, be an
excuse for poor planning and implementation deci-
sions, one of the commonest of which is expanding the
remit of the programme.
Avoiding mission creep
Whilst in large scale IT projects certain complications
are to be expected, a particular problem seems to be
their frequently changing scope and increasing breadth.13
For example, the National Programme for IT was
originally planned to deliver the NHS CRS, the Elec-
tronic Prescription Service and Choose and Book.
Later, it was expanded to include a number of other
applications such as, for example, GP2GP, the Picture
Archiving andCommunication System andNHSmail.
Despite the fact that implementation of aspects of
these secondary applications ismaking better progress
than that towards the primary outcomes, the diﬃculty
with mission creep is that it inevitably takes policy-
makers’ and implementers’ attention oﬀ the primary
focus of the programme.
It also has to be kept inmind that the overall plan of
creating nationally shared electronic health records
was initially intended to emerge from local systems
that would eventually be linked together. This has
subsequently changed to a more ambitious approach
driven in the main by national networking of systems
and has led, many have argued, to a lack of sensitivity
and responsiveness to local needs.8
Similarly, changes in cost estimations, overall im-
plementation strategy and local implementers have
led to a lack of public and professional belief in the
programme and those delivering it. It has conse-
quently been argued that what is needed is greater
transparency of how policy decisions are made so that
these can be scrutinised against the original plans.8
Although iteration is crucial, a careful balance needs
to be achieved between wholesale change of direction
andmodiﬁcation of plans (although admittedly under
some circumstances a complete change of direction
may be unavoidable). What appears crucial is that
attention is not allowed to deﬂect oﬀ the main tasks at
hand as a result of trying to deal with secondary
considerations.
System usability and meaningful
stakeholder engagement
The NHS CRS is likely to have a signiﬁcant impact on
working practices. For example, Berg discusses the
active role of the medical record in the healthcare
setting by considering three case studies, both in single
physician–patient encounters and in multidisciplinary
care teams, and the ways in which the medical record
can mediate and inﬂuence social and professional
relationships.14 Berg describes, for instance, how the
record structures medical work through the processes
of reading andwriting, how it co-ordinates care across
professional boundaries and also how it contributes to
sustaining power relationships between healthcare
professionals. Similarly, Berg and Bowker describe how
themedical record can contribute to shaping patients’
bodies and histories, how it impacts on social pro-
cesses in health care and how it serves diﬀerent func-
tions for diﬀerent actors, all of which need to come
together for the record to function optimally.15 Al-
though these analyses are based on paper records, they
indicate the extent to which the introduction of the
NHSCRS is likely to transform the experiences of both
delivering and receiving care.16
Cultural change is best eﬀected if users can be
meaningfully engaged in design and deployment
considerations. Above all, the NHS CRS needs to
be perceived as useful and also user-friendly as these
are essential prerequisites for eﬀective use.17,18 The
most important way of ensuring usability is through
fostering close collaborations between the designers
of applications and end-users, as it is this latter
group that is most familiar with the context in which
the new application will be deployed.5,19,20 Since it is
important for designs to evolve during the establish-
ment of a new application in an organisation,21
continuous testing of prototypes with diﬀerent groups
of end-users and redesign of initial and future
releases of the NHS CRS will need to be carefully
planned.22–24 The user informed design guidance,
which is part of the NHS Common User Interface
Programme, is a step in the right direction.25
However, the need to engage meaningfully with
end-users extends well beyond issues relating to design.
Both individual and group resistance to change is a real
threat to the success of the NHSCRS. Garside highlights
areas that have been identiﬁed as towhy individualsmay
resist change, these including parochial self interest
(stakeholders may lose something with the change, e.g.
professional status), resentment (can be with either indi-
viduals leading change or with change itself), diﬀerent
perceptions of change (this depends on the individual’s
position in the organisation), misunderstanding or lack
of trust and a low tolerance for change.12 Group and
organisational resistance to change may stem from
feeling threatened in the group structure (e.g. shift in
The NHS CRS: recommendations from the literature on successful implementation and adoption 157
power balance) and/or disruption of social professional
norms.12,26 A sensitive approach aware of potential
sources of both individual and group resistance is
therefore essential.
At present, there is still a lack of clarity amongst
various stakeholders as towhat exactly theNHSCRS is
(in anything other than broad aspirational terms).
This makes it diﬃcult for end-users to begin to
appreciate how the use of an EHRS will be integrated
into day-to-day working practices. These uncertain-
ties are impacting adversely on users’ perceptions of
the programme, contributing to negativity and an
inability to see what is expected of users during the
process of implementation and, equally importantly,
what the personal or patient-level beneﬁts of engage-
ment might be.
What is therefore needed is far greater clarity on
what it is that will be implemented, how this will ﬁt
into existingwork practices and a realistic statement of
timelines for implementation. Although NHS CFH has
made a broad set of goals available, these now need
to be reﬁned and tailored to individual professions.
Aligning goals with timelines and diﬀerentiating be-
tween short- and long-term outcomes may be a
helpful way of conceptualising this. This process is,
again, best informed by actual engagement with end-
users themselves while actively seeking opinions and
divergent viewpoints in order to promote collective
decisionmakingand increase individual autonomy.20,27,28
Only then can users be systematically targeted and
motivated to use the application.
Utilising informal social peer networking in inﬂu-
encing end-user perceptions of a new application is
likely to be important in this context.6,7 This may take
the form of demonstrations given by colleagues from
early adopter sites, workshops or meetings attended
by enthusiasts from the same profession, or those who
have knowledge of how to use the NHS CRS speaking
about their experiences. Ideally, key players to be
targeted are inﬂuential individuals (such as managers,
consultants or senior nurses) who are similar to future
users (e.g. from the same profession) and have exper-
ience of using NHS CRS prototypes. Although work-
shops demonstrating the new system to healthcare
professionals exist, these are currently mainly led by
system suppliers. Professional networking is begin-
ning to occur, but this is often self-organised rather
than facilitated by NHS CFH.
It has to be kept in mind, however, that a variety of
social networks are likely to exist in the context of
implementing the NHS CRS. These may be operating
at both a micro (e.g. profession speciﬁc, departmental)
and macro level (e.g. hospitals, NHS trusts, clusters).
Each of these need to be targeted separately as diﬀerent
groups are likely to use the application in diﬀerent
ways. Non-clinical staﬀ groups such as, for example,
administrative staﬀ also have needs in this respect that
are easily overlooked.
NHS CFH may also wish to consider setting up a
social network around the NHS CRS in order to
promote sharing of ideas and experiences. The ap-
pointment of clinical leads is a good start, but this is
nationally led, rather than locally, which may pose
diﬃculties in cultivating the local networking that
appears particularly important.
Explaining exactly how an integrated electronic
healthcare record may improve care and performance
in a variety of diﬀerent settings as well as hearing and
then addressing end-user concerns is therefore cru-
cial.29 The focus here should be to build on existing
values in the NHS, rather than any technical impera-
tives.16 There is the related urgent need to provide
clinicians with quantitative data on how theNHSCRS
is helping to enhance service delivery, rather than
outcomes relating to numbers of users (as seems
more typical at present).9 There is an opportunity to
begin to generate such evidence from studying ﬁrst-
wave sites implementing the NHS CRS.
Local ownership and compatibility
A particular problem in the NHS CRS is that its
implementation is top-down and it is therefore liable
to be perceived as being imposed by the government.
Implementation was (at least initially) planned as a
‘big bang’ strategy. This is, however, now changing
towards so-called ‘soft launches’ of the NHS CRS,
starting on particular wards and allowing for local
adjustments to take place. Nevertheless, trusts are asked
to purchase from a range of nationally accredited
systems provided by a limited number of providers,
restricting local input and choice.8 This often includes
having to replace perfectly well functioning patient
administration systemswith those that are compatible
with the systems purchased by NHS CFH.
Previous research has shown that top-down ‘big
bang’ implementations can contribute to increased
user resistance and therefore carry a high risk of
failure.30,31 Smaller, locally developed projects, on the
other hand, that work ‘from the ground up,’ may lead
to increased end-user acceptance.13 Examples from
within Scotland and Wales, and from overseas (e.g.
Kaiser Permanente in the USA), of the success of
locally developed EHRs support this view. In such
scenarios, systems are developed organically on a
locality basis and the governments’ role is to pull these
together rather than to drive implementation.32
Incremental approaches to change, negotiating goals
carefully along the way, may be more eﬀective than
‘big bang’ approaches as these are likely to result in
increased user acceptance. Negotiation is needed in
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relation to design as well as the integration of tech-
nology into existing work processes.21,31,33 If users are
allowed to identify individual beneﬁts to them and
their patients of using the new system (as opposed to
organisational beneﬁts only) this can prevent poten-
tial resistance.34 Otherwise they may develop either
‘partial use’ (i.e. only using the parts that are useful to
them) or ‘workarounds’ (i.e. avoiding using the sys-
tem altogether).35
Engagement needs to occur on a variety of levels to
include stakeholders, NHS CFH and local NHS or-
ganisations and trusts. The latter have so far been
somewhat neglected and their inﬂuence has not been
suﬃciently harnessed. It needs to be realised that local
organisations can be instrumental in opening chan-
nels of communication between NHS CFH and indi-
vidual stakeholders.
It is further important to clearly deﬁne both the role
of NHS CFH as the external change agency and its
relationship to adopters. However, although NHS
CFH is now responsible for all aspects of implemen-
tation, there is still some confusion on the ground as to
where exactly NHS CFH’s responsibilities stop and
local responsibilities begin to take over. The notion of
the rather unfortunately termed National Local Own-
ership Partnership (NLOP) belies this confusion. This
is further complicated by the increasing development
of local systems and so-called ‘interim’ solutions.
Evaluation
The importance of appropriate and programme-tail-
ored evaluation in IT innovation has been repeatedly
highlighted in order to investigate reasons for failure
and factors for success.36,37 Evaluation can be diﬃcult
in a complex programme such as the National Pro-
gramme for IT. Speciﬁcally, the introduction of the
NHS CRS is diﬃcult to evaluate as it is somultifaceted
(Figure 1) and impacts on so many aspects of care
delivery and organisational processes. Evaluation activ-
ities will need to involve allocating designated staﬀ and
giving feedback to the public, individual staﬀ, depart-
ments and hospital trusts. It will also involve a delib-
erate eﬀort to investigate intended and unintended
outcomes as well as unanticipated eﬀects (e.g. such as
those subtle impacts on changes in social relationships
discussed earlier).
Several evaluations of components of the National
Programme for IT (including the NHS CRS) have
already been commissioned by the NHS CFH Evalu-
ation Programme, although given the probable time
needed for these interventions to infuse or embed
within the NHS the timescales of these evaluations
may need to be reconsidered.38,39 Promoting an
increased awareness and involvement of key stake-
holders in evaluation activities will be of primary
importance in this context. Eﬀorts will in due course
also need to focus on utilising and disseminating data
from these eﬀectively. This will mean concentrating
not only on summative evaluation but, more import-
antly, also on formative evaluation that can help to
address problems iteratively. The focus of existing
evaluation projects (including the evaluation of the
NHSCRS) hasmainly been on qualitativemethods, as
these are well suited to investigate complex socio-
technical issues that may diﬀer across local settings.40
Qualitative investigations also allow for more local
input from trusts and staﬀ on the ground, thereby
facilitating formative evaluation and learning from
their experiences.
Conclusions and
recommendations
We acknowledge that the introduction of the NHS
CRS is a complex venture that will involve a
fundamental reorganisation of healthcare delivery
structures. Whilst keeping in mind that the pro-
gramme may ultimately bring important beneﬁts, its
nature and scale have brought signiﬁcant challenges
for all stakeholders and have led to discussions sur-
rounding the adequacy of the implementation strategy.
What is now needed are realistic expectations and
transparent decision making by all involved, mean-
ingful end-user engagement and usability testing, and
an increased focus on promoting local ownership and
formative evaluation.
During this process, tracking of occurring problems
and an iterative reﬁnement of the NHS CRS will be
important. This will require negotiation with stake-
holders, and careful consideration of how reﬁnements
will be handled and how much modiﬁcation will be
allowed locally. Acknowledging the inherent diﬃcult-
ies and complexities on the part of all stakeholders will
be crucial in shifting the focus from blame to team-
work.
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